

Overview of the Boko Haram's Sources of Finance, Weapons and Logistics

¹Babayo Sule

²Sani Yakubu Gombe PhD

babayosule@gmail.com

sanigombe925@gmail.com

07038653490

08036298053

¹Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities Management and Social Sciences, Federal University Kashere Gombe, Gombe State Nigeria

²Department of Vocational Education, School of Early Childcare and Primary Education, Federal College of Education (Technical) Gombe

Abstract: The Boko Haram insurgency is a tragedy that cost thousands of lives and consumed properties worth billions of Naira. It is a traumatic experience in the Northeastern Nigeria and some parts of Northwest in which the inhabitants exist in a constant psychological fear and devastation. The Boko Haram insurgents used heavy weapons and sophisticated transportation in addition to other modern logistics to carry out their insurgency activities. This study is an examination of the sources of finance, weapons, transportation, intelligence and other logistics that the Boko Haram used in their tactical approach. The problem is; despite the superior firepower and financial muscles of the Nigerian Government, the insurgents continued to carry out their activities for a longer period of a time undeterred. The study used a qualitative method of data collection and analysis in which data was collected from primary source and secondary sources. The data obtained were discussed and analysed using a content analysis method in which thematic analytical interpretations were adopted. The research discovered that the Boko Haram insurgents sourced their means of finance, weapons and other logistics internally and externally through various sources which made it difficult for blocking by the government because of the complexity involved in the process. The research recommends that, the sources of finance, weapons, logistics and even the ideology of the insurgents must be identified, deterred and prevented in future to avoid the occurrence of such movements.

Keywords: Boko Haram; Finance; Insurgency; Logistics; Northeastern Nigeria; Weapons.

Introduction

The Boko Haram insurgency is one of the deadliest insurgents' groups in the globe contemporarily because of their activities and its effects in terms of devastation of lives and properties in addition to other socioeconomic and political problems that the insurgency created. From a radical Islamic preaching anchored specifically in protest against the Western educational system and culture, the group gradually metamorphosed into a full-blown insurgency between the period of 2009 to 2012 claiming thousands of lives and destroying properties worth billions of Naira (El Kaim, 2012).

Historically, Islamic militant movement does not emanate from the Boko Haram insurgency only. Some thirty years back, there was a replica of a radical movement called 'Maitatsine' which also claimed several lives and properties in some parts of Northern Nigeria. Thus, the Boko Haram movement does not come as a surprise, but it has taken all by surprise owing to the magnitude of the devastation, loss and the dimension that the crisis have taken. These Islamic militant groups often cite Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths to justify their ill-perceived teaching and movements out of ignorance, misinterpretation of the texts, selfishness, hidden motives and an alleged conspiracy of the external enemies of Islam (Isah, 2010:338). However, this position taken by the extremists had been clearly debunked by Islamic scholars of great repute who counter the narratives from the fundamentalists to avoid the dangerous situation warned by the Prophet (PBUH) which will be the reminiscent of the havoc caused the likes of Boko Haram.

One fundamental issue of concern for all concerned Muslims and Nigerian citizens is how the Boko Haram was able to organise itself within a short period of a time, coordinate attacks tactically and strategically, secure weapons, finance and other logistics to undertake these detrimental attacks. Many factors were advanced as the main reasons behind this movement. Some scholars (Forest, 2012 and De Montclos 2014) related the activities of Boko Haram to state failure where the misgovernance of the Nigerian state

for many decades led to massive and abject penury, chronic hunger, diseases, illness, unemployment, hopelessness and restiveness for the teeming idle youth in the country and particularly, in the Northeastern part of the country where the scorch of poverty is worse with over 70 of the total population in the region living in absolute poverty (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Other factors related to the Boko Haram emergence can be attributed to the culture and nature of Northern Nigeria, religious intolerance and fundamentalism, ignorance, external factors, the terrain of Nigerian geography such as porous borders and the large contiguous nature of the Nigerian state (Harvard Divinity Project, 2018).

The Boko Haram insurgency affected nine states in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (FCTA) sharply which includes all the Northeastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe which are the areas that the incidence emanated from its inception. Other affected parts of the country are Kano and Kaduna in the Northwestern Nigeria, Plateau in the Northcentral and the FCTA. These states constitute about 25% of the estimated total population of Nigeria which is currently assumed to be approximately 200 million as at 2018. The states and the FCTA were devastated and terrorised by the activities of the insurgents which displaced millions of the inhabitants in these areas and destroyed properties worth billions of Naira (NBS, 2017).

From the above introduction, this study is an attempt to examine critically the sources of funds for financing the Boko Haram activities, their sources of weapons and other logistics. In doing so, this paper asked the following questions: how does the Boko Haram sourced for their weapons to undertake their insurgency activities? What is the source of funds for the Boko Haram activities? What is the other means of logistics for the Boko Haram insurgents and Why isn't difficult for the Nigerian government to curtail the activities of Boko Haram for many years? In doing so, it is pertinent to discuss briefly other related issues such as the background of the area of study, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the manifestations, impacts and the responses of the Nigerian government and the international community.

Literature Review

The literature is reviewed thematically according to the major issues from the subject of discussion in the context of this work. Based on the themes, the following are critically examined: the Boko Haram insurgency, genesis of Boko Haram insurgency, causes of Boko Haram insurgency, manifestations of Boko Haram insurgency, impact of Boko Haram insurgency and the responses of the Nigerian government and the international community.

The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency emerged from the Northeastern Nigeria as a reminiscent of the misperception and misinterpretation of the Islamic religious texts which led to extremism from some misguided youth. This phenomenon has been aided by the scorch of poverty, misgovernance, state failure and lack of concern from the authorities in terms of censoring religious extremism (Campbell, 2014). Boko Haram started as a conservative radical preaching against the Western ideology and Western educational, political, economic and social institutions in Nigeria particularly in the Muslim dominated societies but, the sect later transformed itself fully into an insurgent organisation with deadly attacks that claimed thousands of lives. The group formally proclaimed itself as 'Jama'atu Ahlul Sunnah Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad' meaning in English as 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad'. The group earned the nomenclature 'Boko Haram' in Hausa language being the lingua franca in Northern Nigeria meaning 'Western education is prohibited' because of its critical rejection and resentment of the Western educational system (Bowser and Sanders, 2012).

The group which started in Borno State in the early 2000s was seen as an offshoot of the hitherto, Maitatsine sect which existed in the same parts that are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. the Maitatsine and Boko Haram pronounced unequivocally their resentment of anything Western and they embarked on radical teachings against it. They later took weapons to establish Islamic state in Nigeria according to their ideology and movement. The Boko Haram might have started since 2000 under the name Taliban in Yobe and Kano States (Ahokegh, 2013). However, the Boko Haram sect emanated from radical preaching in Borno, Yobe and other Northeastern states and later spread to some parts of Northwest, Northcentral and FCTA, before it turned into an armed group after the extrajudicial killing of their leader Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 in which they metamorphosed into a full insurgent group.

Genesis of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

The actual date, scene and the conditions that led to the emergence of Boko Haram sect is not yet certain with a sacrosanct verdict. There are different views of the early movements of the group as a religious sect. one of the scholars (Onuoha, 2010:55) argued that the group emerged since 1995 under the leadership of one Malam Abubakar Lawal in Yobe State. The group continued to develop from the period and underwent several forms of transformation and naming such as Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Hijra to the Nigerian Taliban to Yusufiyyah sect to Boko Haram. It is believed that the first attack from the group occurred in 2003 in Kanama and Geidam in Yobe State in the Northeast and in Panshekara in the Northwestern Kano State in 2005. This view is contrary to most of the recent works on Boko Haram which emphasised that 2009 is the heyday of the insurgency of Boko Haram.

Boko Haram is perceived and translated from different school of thoughts based on the investigations of the researchers, their activities and personal perception of scholars. It is viewed as a political movement aimed at revolting against the existing oppressive political status quo. It is relatively identified as a religious extremism that was heralded by ignorance and misinterpretation of the Islamic texts which tantamount to the present violence. Yet, the criminal aspect of the movement cannot be divorced as it is seen from the angle of criminal activities from restive youth who became hopelessness in their country land because of poor political and socioeconomic order. This is because the activities of the group transformed into an insurgency from 2009 after the extrajudicial killing of their leader Muhammad Yusuf. The group started attacking mosques, churches, army barracks, markets, public gathering with sophisticated modern weapons such as AK-47, bombs, RGPs and other modern warfare (De Montclos, 2014:137).

In another different view, it is stressed that the Boko Haram group was established in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri in 2002. From 2002 to date, the sect underwent different forms of transformations. Coordination, re-organisation, activities and movements at different stages (Giroux & Gilpin, 2014:2). Sergie & Johnson (2014) subscribed to the above view that the Boko Haram emerged and was established in 2002 by the late Muhammad Yusuf. However, a convincing view is presented by Nkechi (2013) who argued that there are no specific dates, events and activities that can be relied on as a plausible explanation of the establishment of Boko Haram. Preferably, it is better to assume that the movement started underground for many years before it manifested in the public arena and that, the starting point of insurgency has been the first attacks under the name Taliban in 2003 in Yobe

State and in 2005 in Panshekara in Kano State but, the movement totally became violent in 2009 after the departure of Muhammad Yusuf, the sect leader.

The Boko Haram group is believed in another view to have been established by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 but, the man got admission in University of Madina and left for Saudi Arabia. Before the departure of Abubakar Lawan, he appointed Muhammad Yusuf to superintend over the affairs of the sect. Boko Haram was initially a peaceful but, rather radical and conservative group which preached against Western education and Western values in the Muslim society. However, the 2009 incidence proved otherwise of the peaceful nature of the group from its inception. The group suddenly turned violent with the extrajudicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf in 2009. The group turned itself into an insurgency attacking different places, groups and targets in Nigeria involving Christians, Muslims, Nigerians, foreigners, troops, civilians, northerners and residents in the north. Their activities graduated into international borders of Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad which led to a concern by the international community (Barna, 2014:1). If the group is peaceful initially as suggested by the author above, then how does it procured sophisticated weapons ahead of its clash with the Nigerian security operatives in 2009? There might have been a gradual design to embark on insurgency by the group in stages as it appeared later. This is the position of this work.

The Boko Haram sect since 2009 has been attacking the police. Military, public servants, academicians, politicians, notable figures, schools, places of worship, public institutions and civilians across the Northeast and other parts of Northern Nigeria (Cook, 2014:4). The sect cited the influence of the Western system on the stagnation and moral decadence of the Muslim society in Nigeria. The group blamed the Muslim leaders in Nigeria and politicians of infidelity and subserviency to the Western values and culture as against the provision of the pure Islamic teaching. The sect leaders maintained their position by citing several Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths to justify their position of detesting the Western educational and political system (Forest, 2012:3). This position has been adequately debunked by many Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam, Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani Zaria and Sheikh Isah Ali Ibrahim Pantami.

The 2009 clash led to the change of leadership in the Boko Haram sect where a new leader Abubakar Shekau emerged and took over the mantle of leadership of the movement. This was the watershed in the activities of the insurgents because on assumption of leadership, Abubakar Shekau declared

in an audio tape in 2010 that he has identified the Nigerian government, the US, the European countries and Nigerian Muslims that differ from their views as infidels and he declared war against them. The group alleged that it will establish an Islamic state and a Caliphate in Nigeria and West Africa. The sect attracted most of its members from the suburbs of the Northeastern states where the incidence of poverty and unemployment is higher in the country (Zenn, 2012).

As observed earlier, this was not the first time that an insurgent group emerged in Northern Nigeria. It was experienced in the 1980s and 1990s under the pretext of Maitatsine and the Boko Haram was categorised into the same group with the likes of Maitatsine by their ideology of detesting Western education and revolting against the existing order. (Umar, 2013:1). Perhaps, Boko Haram differs with Maitatsine because it has modern sophisticated weapons and its attacks became wider in target than Maitatsine (Blanchard 2014 and Rogers, 2012). Like many radical organisations, the Boko Haram sect believed that full implementation of Shari'ah must be established by violence and rejection of Western institutions and structures (Montclos, 2014:8). Despite numerous factors that may have suppressed the movement, Boko Haram has emerged not only to continue their operations but to grow and evolve as an organisation (ElKhaim, 2012:1). This is perhaps, because their source of weapons, finance and logistics continue to flourish unabated or unidentified or unchallenged by the Nigerian security.

Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

Multiple causes were advanced for the emergence of Boko Haram as an insurgent group by different groups. The first cause is the one presented by the sect itself that the injustice, oppression, inequality and failure to institute Islamic law in Northern Nigeria because of total adherence to the Western political system is their justification for the insurgency. This view is not accepted by many scholars of Islam, Western researchers, analysts, academics and other stakeholders in the security sector. For instance, all the Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths that they quoted to justify their resentment of Western education were countered brilliantly by the Sheikhs mentioned above. But, the numerous verses and Hadith that they quoted were believed by Islamic clerics as misapplication, misguidance, misinterpretation and misperception of the verses. Al Qardawi (1991:20) submitted that all forms of insurgency and terrorism by the Muslim youth across the globe contemporarily is because of poor understanding of the teaching of Islam and misinterpretation of the Quran and Hadiths. He further suggested that these kinds of extremists are identifiable with some evidences

and are exactly the ones that the Prophet (PBUH) warned the Muslim Ummah of their coming and ill-activities among the Muslim Ummah. From the above view, it can be established that extremism emanating from a poor understanding of religion is one of the major causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria. Other factors or possible explanations are discussed below.

Apart from the above argument, poor socioeconomic and political condition, poverty, unemployment and ignorance in Northern Nigeria propelled the emergence of groups like Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria (Forest, 2012). Forest (2012) identified the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency in relation to the above by Forest (2012) as youth unemployment, social inequality, social and economic exclusion as well as lack of proper censorship of religious activities by the government. The failure of the Nigerian leaders to utilise the available resources to improve the life of the common man in the country and misgovernance, porous borders and chronic pervasive corruption are other causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Ahokegh, 2014). Bamidele (2012) identified the salient causes of Boko Haram insurgency to misgovernance, ethnoreligious rivalries, weak political institution and state failure in addition to abject penury and social inequality as well as the legacy of the external forces of global terrorism.

The high level of poverty, extremism courtesy of religious misperception, climatic change which affected the socioeconomic aspect of the Lake Chad inhabitants are also factors that ushered in the Boko Haram insurgency (Sergie & Johnson, 2014). Additional factors identified behind the emergence of Boko Haram are massive corruption among the security personnel, politicians and bureaucrats in the defense sector, poor intelligence from the security agency, unemployment, injustice, religious misperception and intolerance, ignorance, elite rivalry, ethnoreligious crises and inequality (Nkechi, 2013). Al Qaeda and global terrorism network or globalisation of terror is another reason identified for the emergence of Boko Haram. The 9/11 attacks witnessed the zenith of the global terrorism and that has influenced the emergence of other terror groups (Olojo, 2013).

The condition of poor governance, corrupt practices and socioeconomic malaise in the North created the foundation for the emergence of insecurity in Northern Nigeria (Barna 2014 and Meagher, 2014:1). Ideology and state failure in proffering measures of countering militant groups in the country such as the Niger-Delta militants paved the way for the emergence of other militants' groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria (Isah, 2010:338). Another scholar added that the dichotomy in educational level and income inequality

between the North and the South followed by sharp poverty, inequality and social injustice are what led to the root causes of Boko Haram movement in the North (Umar, 2013). Rogers (2012) supported the above position unanimously. However, in another different view from all the above, a scholar (De Montclos, 2014:8) viewed the cause of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria as an outcome of the use of force in handling the force during its first clash with the security agency in the region and the subsequent killing of their leader extra judiciously.

Manifestations of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency or attacks started gradually as noticed above in 2003 from Yobe State and in 2005 in Kano. But, the full scale of the insurgents' violence began in 2009 and it has topped its highest zenith in 2013 with the sect controlling more than 20 local governments in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states constituting nearly 30 percent of the Northeast region attacking with sophisticated guns such as AK 47, improvised device explosives, grenades and other equipment of battle killing soldiers, police and other security personnel and also attacking civilians in the mosques, churches, markets, at their residences and everywhere. This study identified these attacks from their inceptions and summarised them below for easy perception.

Table 1: Manifestations of Boko Haram Activities from its Inception to Date

| Date | Event | Place | Casualties |
|-------------|---|--------------|----------------------|
| 2002 | Organisation of the group under Muhammad Yusuf | Maiduguri | None |
| Dec. 2003 | Attacks on multiple police stations in Yobe State | Yobe | Unknown |
| July 2009 | Uprising in Bauchi, Borno Kano and Yobe | Northeast | 700 Boko Haram died |
| July 2010 | Abubakar Shekau appointed as the new leader | Northeast | None |
| Sept. 2010 | Attack on prison in Bauchi by 50 Boko Haram members | Bauchi | 700 inmates released |
| May 2011 | Boko Haram detonates three IEDs near barracks in Bauchi | Bauchi | 10 people died |
| Aug. 2011 | Attack on police station in Gombi and two banks | Adamawa | 12 people died |
| Aug. | Attacks on United Nations building in Abuja | Abuja | 23 died 75 injured |

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|------------|---|-----------|---------------------|
| 2011 | | | |
| Nov. 2011 | Multiple attacks with IEDs in Yobe and Borno | Northeast | More than 100 died |
| Jan. 2012 | Splinter group known as Ansaru emerged | Northeast | None |
| Jan. 2012 | Coordinated attacks on police stations and barracks | Kano | 200 people died |
| Mar. 2012 | Attacks on police station in Gombe | Gombe | 23 died |
| Aug. 2012 | Claims on peace talk with government debunked by the sect | Northeast | None |
| Feb. 2013 | A French family of seven kidnapped in Northern Cameroon | Cameroon | Seven |
| Apr. 2013 | Shekau mocked the Government's plan amnesty | Nigeria | None |
| Apr. 2013 | Battle with multinational taskforce in Baga | Borno | More than 200 died |
| May 2013 | Announcement of military offensive in Northeast | Northeast | Uncertain |
| June 2013 | Government proscribed Boko Haram as a terrorist group | Abuja | None |
| June 2013 | Multiple attacks in churches on Sunday in Northeast | Northeast | More than 50 died |
| Aug. 2013 | Ministry of Defense announced the death of top member | Maiduguri | 1 |
| Aug. 2013 | Nigeria's Army claimed Shekau died but he debunked it | Nigeria | None |
| Sept. 2013 | Attack in checkpoint in Benisheik | Borno | More than 143 died |
| Sept. 2013 | Shekau appeared in a video claiming he is healthy and alive | Northeast | None |
| Nov. 2013 | United States declared Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist | U S A | None |
| Jan. 2014 | Shootings in market in Kawuri | Borno | 45 died |
| Feb. 2014 | Militants attacked village in Konduga | Borno | 23 died |
| Apr. 2014 | Boko Haram abducted 276 teenage girls in Chibok | Borno | More than 200 gone |
| May 2014 | Shekau claimed the abduction of Chibok girls | Borno | None |
| May 2014 | Attacks on three villages in Borno but the villagers resisted | Borno | 200 Boko Haram died |
| May 2014 | Twin bomb blast in a market in the city of Jos | Plateau | 118 died |
| May | United States sent 80 troops to Chad | Chad | None |

| | | | |
|------------|---|-----------|----------------------|
| 2014 | | | |
| May 2014 | The US Security Council added Boko Haram as terrorist | UN | None |
| June 2014 | Raids by Boko Haram in Borno | Borno | About 500 died |
| June 2014 | More young women were kidnapped by Boko Haram | Borno | 20 |
| June 2014 | Boko Haram abducted 60 women and killed many in Kumaza | Borno | 30 men killed |
| July 2014 | Abducted girls from Kumaza escaped | Borno | None |
| July 2014 | Damboa was raided by Boko Haram | Borno | 66 died 15000 fled |
| Oct. 2014 | Announcement of ceasefire by Nigerian Government | Abuja | None |
| Nov. 2014 | Shekau in a video denied the announced ceasefire | Borno | None |
| Jan. 2015 | Baga town taken over by Boko Haram | Borno | More than 2000 died |
| Jan. 2015 | Multiple explosion in Borno | Borno | 20 killed 18 injured |
| Mar. 2015 | Two people were beheaded by Boko Haram suspected as spies | Borno | 2 died |
| Mar. 2015 | Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS | Borno | None |
| Mar. 2015 | ISIS announced the acceptance of the pledge by Boko Haram | Iraq | None |
| Apr. 2015 | Massive killings in Damasak | Borno | More than 400 killed |
| Apr. 2015 | Nigerian troops rescued many civilians from Boko Haram | Borno | 450 rescued |
| July 2015 | Boko Haram militants raid three villages in Borno | Borno | 145 killed |
| Sept. 2015 | Nigerian military rescued many civilians from Boko Haram | Borno | 241 |
| Sept. 2015 | Attacks in a market in Kerewa | Cameroon | 30 died 145 injured |
| Sept. 2015 | 241 women rescued by Nigerian military from Boko Haram | Borno | 241 rescued |
| Feb. 2016 | Attacks on two villages in Northeast by the militants | Northeast | 30 killed |
| Feb. 2016 | Suicide bombing in Northeast | Northeast | 58 died |
| Apr. 2016 | CNN posted a live video of the kidnapped Chibok girls | Northeast | None |
| May | One of the Chibok girls rescued by Nigerian | Borno | 1 rescued |

| | | | |
|------------|---|-----------|----------------------------|
| 2016 | military | | |
| Aug. 2016 | ISIS announced Musab Al Barnawi as the new sect leader | Borno | None |
| Aug. 2016 | Chibok girls video released by Boko Haram | Borno | None |
| Oct. 2016 | A negotiation led to the release of 21 Chibok girls | Borno | 21 released |
| Nov. 2016 | Chibok school girl found by Nigerian Army | Borno | I discovered |
| Jan. 2017 | Another Chibok girl found | Borno | I found |
| Jan. 2017 | Nigerian fighter jet mistakenly hit civilians | Borno | About 100 died |
| May 2017 | 82 Chibok school girls released | Borno | 82 released |
| Jan. 2018 | Blast in Northeastern town of Madagali | Adamawa | 3 people killed |
| Jan. 2018 | Blast in Mosque in Gamboru | Borno | 14 civilians killed |
| Jan.2018 | Multiple blast in Maiduguri, Adamawa and Konduga | Northeast | 21 killed over 100 injured |
| Feb. 2018 | Attacks in Kala Balge near IDPs camp | Borno | 11 killed scores injured |
| Feb. 2018 | 110 girls were abducted in Dapchi Town | Yobe | 110 abducted |
| Mar. 2018 | Threat to harm Leah Sharibu one of the girls abducted in Dapchi | Northeast | 1 Under threat |
| Mar. 2018 | Landmines explosion in Dikwa | Borno | 4 killed several injured |
| Apr. 2018 | Attacks on military base in Jere | Borno | 20 killed and 84 injured |
| Apr. 2018 | Attack on forest workers in Gamboru | Borno | 18 killed |
| May. 2018 | Suicide bombing in the mosque in Mubi | Adamawa | 38 killed with 64 injured |
| May.2018 | Suicide bombing in the mosque in Dikwa | Borno | 16 killed and 60 injured |
| June. 2018 | Suicide bombing in Damboa | Borno | 43 killed 84 wounded |
| June. 2018 | Attacks in Banki | Borno | 4 killed 20 injured |

Source: CNN Library 2018 (compilation in tabular form made by the authors). Retrieved from <https://avarchivingjobs.wordpress.com/2016/10/30/cnn-library-internship-2-positions-spring-2017-cnn-atlanta-ga/> and Wikipedia retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Boko_Haram_insurgency

The above compilation is just the major events and attacks by the militants there were hundreds or even thousands that were not reported by this report and some of them are famous like the Abuja Nyanya twin bomb blast which killed more than 100 people, the Kano mosque attack which killed more than 200 people, uncountable bomb attacks in Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Kano, Plateau and Abuja in addition to many local governments that were captured and controlled by Boko Haram such as Gwoza, Bama, Baga, Madagali, Mubi, Damboa and many other bigger towns in the Northeast. If all these are taken into account, there are ten times more than what the CNN Library reported. The report is either bias or deliberately omitted areas that are not of interest like numerous attacks in mosques and churches, capture of many local governments in Northeast and many other incidences. However, still the report is useful in giving a sample of what transpired.

Besides the above detailed account of the activities of Boko Haram, the manifestations of their activities earned Nigeria a notorious position and a worst ranking in Global Terrorism Index emerging as the third country affected most by terrorism in the globe according to the ranking as presented below in the table which picked top ten in the ranking.

Table 2: Nigeria's Profile Ranking in Global Terrorism Index in 2017

| Rank | Country | Score |
|-------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1 | Iraq | 10 |
| 2 | Afghanistan | 9.441 |
| 3 | Nigeria | 9.009 |
| 4 | Syria | 8.621 |
| 5 | Pakistan | 8.4 |
| 6 | Yemen | 7.877 |
| 7 | Somalia | 7.654 |
| 8 | India | 7.534 |
| 9 | Turkey | 7.519 |
| 10 | Libya | 7.256 |

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2017

Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has claimed thousands of lives and destroyed properties worth billions of dollars in addition to halting or grounding the economic and commercial activities in the affected areas (Ahokeh, 2013). The phenomenon of Boko Haram led a breach of national security and Nigeria's sovereignty nationally and internationally because the

entire Sahel states of Sub-Saharan West Africa were affected by the insecurity to the extent of drawing the assistance of the international community (Forest, 2012). People in the affected areas lost confidence in the capability of the Nigerian security agencies to secure their lives and properties (Bamidele, 2012). The issue of Boko Haram undermined the prestige of Nigeria and Nigerians abroad as they are being perceived as terror-based citizens. It created a campaign of calumny and stigmatisation deliberately against Islam and the Muslims in which some misinformed academicians, sentimental analysts, biased journalists and other related quarters viewed Muslims and Islam as extremist with a terror-bound nature despite all the rejection of the activities of the insurgents by majority of the Muslims in Nigeria (Aro, 2013).

The Boko Haram insurgency resulted in one of the non-traditional security discourses of food insecurity because most of the inhabitants in the affected areas particularly in the Northeastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Western Chad and Southern Niger were compelled to leave their places and farming land to become refugees in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps spread across the country. This situation created food scarcity in the Northeast, Northern Nigeria and by extension, West Africa (Olojo, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency set another dimension for mutual suspicion between the two major religions in Nigeria; Christianity and Islam. The Christians perceived the insurgency as a Jihad waged against the Christians in Northern Nigeria to convert them forcefully while the Muslims perceived the conspiratorial collaboration of some Christians to sabotage Islam and destroy Muslims in the North where they are the majority (Blanchard 2014 and Isaiah 2004). The insurgency of Boko Haram has pushed the populace in Northern Nigeria in a serious dilemma where they are constantly being targetted by the insurgents in various places and at the same time, they are being killed and tortured by the security personnel even when they are innocent (Omotosho, 2015). The emergence of Boko Haram revealed how vulnerable the Nigerian state is security in terms of the failure of government to improve the lives of the citizenry (El Kaim, 2012).

The Response of the Nigerian Government and the International Community

The Boko Haram insurgency has not been neglected or handled with a nonchalant approach by the Nigerian government. There are serious several measures taken to address the phenomenon. One of these measures is the conventional strategic military operation in the areas that are under the threat of the insurgency especially the Northeastern states in the country as observed by many scholars (Onuoha 2010, Sulaiman 2014, Umar 2013 and

Meagher 2014). In addition, there were series of dialogues, negotiations, re-negotiations, ceasefire between the insurgents and the Nigerian government. Prisoners or Boko Haram captives under the custody of the government are released in exchange for ceasefire and peaceful surrender from the insurgents. On many occasions, this approach has succeeded but, the insurgency still persisted even though, the phenomenon has been recently contained from 2016 to a manageable level.

The international community responded by helping with intelligence information, equipment, logistics and military support too as disclosed by (Serrano & Pieri 2013, Giroux & Gilpin 2014, Barna 2014, Meagher 2014, Blanchard 2014 and De Montclos 2014). However, the responses from both the Nigerian government and the international community failed short of bringing the insurgency to its conclusive end because other fundamental issues are not considered appropriately. For instance, there is a failure in the intelligence of the security to identify the root source of funds, weapons and logistics such as transportation and communication of the Boko Haram insurgents. This has been giving them the advantage to sustain their activities for a longer period than expected. This is why this work identified these challenges as the main focus that should be considered in finalising the war against insurgency permanently in the country.

Theoretical Framework

The work adopted two theories to explain the context of the research, strengthens the literature and support the analysis and findings. The two theories are from the Western and Islamic perspectives. They are:

The Social Conflict Theory

The Doctrine of Extremism

The Social Conflict Theory


The Social Conflict theory originated from the Sociological perspective with scholars like Alfred Marshal, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Talcott Parson (Dahrendorf, 1958). The Social Conflict theory assumes that conflicts are inevitable in the society and there are different sources, nature and types of conflicts. The theory also assumes that social

class struggles is a major source of conflict because all other aspects of human endeavour including political, economic and cultural revolves around class differences and inequality between the classes. Therefore, the theory assumes that for a better approach to conflict resolution in the society, it is pertinent to understand the nature of the varieties of the conflicts and handle them differently accordingly. Conflicts differ from serious ones like wars to mild ones such as intra-party and group conflicts. There are external conflicts brought about by external factors and there are internal conflicts ushered in by internal factors (Dahrendorf, 1958).

The theory further assumes that conflicts is caused by many factors such as religion, class conflict, poverty, unemployment, inequality, social differences, politics, economy, ideology, ethnicity, geography and other similar factors. the theory stresses that in a society like Nigeria with dominant inequality, injustice, hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease and exploitation, there is a likely tendency of rebellion from the aggrieved hopeless unprivileged group. The dominated class will use every means to achieve their goal including violence and aggression. The theory suggests that for a better conflict management, the societal gap of inequality and poverty should be bridged and intelligence gathering should be use or precisely, each conflict should be approach based on the feasible method that will contain it promptly instead of using general approach to resolve diverse conflict. Some of the conflicts require the use of force, some require the use of dialogue or negotiation as appropriate (Dahrendorf, 1958).

The theory is strong in its origin because it has the philosophical root from the famous world sociologist that are the early pioneer founders of the discipline. The theory also is stronger in the sense that it has the leverage of explaining all forms of societal conflicts in practical applicability from all dimensions with a step by step illustrations from its assumptions. The theory is weak in its ambition of categorising every conflict from its own root instead of making a simpler grouping that will enable for an easier discussion. The theory assumes that social conflicts are caused by many factors such as religion, inequality, poverty, unemployment and other socioeconomic indicators which clearly explains the Nigerian context as far as the Boko Haram insurgency is concerned. It is caused by a combination of many factors including the religion, poverty, inequality, ignorance, unemployment and other related factors. the theory assumes that social conflicts should be studied in isolation or separately so that the method of approaching could be identified since it is not all conflicts that require that require the same approach.

Figure 1: Showing the Assumptions and Applicability of the Social Conflict Theory in Nigeria



Source: Design by the Authors 2018.

The above figure clearly shows a correlation between the Social Conflict theory and the society or violence in the case of insurgency in Northern Nigeria. This is because among the causes identified in the assumption is religious factor which in the case of this study is the major driving force behind the conflict. At the same time, the theory in the second aspect of the model shows the impacts of the conflicts which consists the use of violence as in the case of Boko Haram insurgency. The theory in the last aspect of the model indicates that every social conflict has its own suitable means or

approach of resolving it and this model provides alternatives to the Nigerian government on Boko Haram issues to choose the suitable one after identifying the causes and the implications as designed in the model.

The Doctrine of Extremism


Al Qaradawi (1991) postulates some assumptions using some indicators to identify theoretically the root of extremism in Islam and its impact on the Muslim Ummah. According to him, extremism is like a disease in its early stage in which if it is diagnosed at its early phase, it can be prevented or cured with ease but, if it is allowed despite the identification of the symptoms to continue to manifest, it will escalate beyond repair and lead to extinction of the affected victim. Moving towards extremism is a reminiscent of avoiding the moderation taught by Islam especially by the youth in contemporary Muslim societies. The governments in these countries failed to monitor the youth accordingly leaving them to embrace ideas that are detrimental to the well-being of the Islamic societies. These youths misperceived and misinterpreted the contexts of the Quran and Sunnah and emerged as extremist and violent in their nature and approach to religious matters (Qaradawi, 1991:9).

Extremism manifested in six stages as identified by Al Qaradawi (1999:9). The first stage is bigotry and intolerance. This emanated from the view that an individual's opinion is the supreme and there is no any other opinion that can be tolerated apart from their own (Qaradawi, 1991:20). The second manifestation is an imposition of the extreme end of religious views on the populace despite the moderate alternative provided by Allah and His Messenger (PBUH). These extremists believed that even by force you must agree and follow their teaching and movements or face their wrath (Qaradawi, 1991:23). The third manifestation is "uncalled for austerity" where people are compelled to do what is not required of them like forcing non-Muslims to practice Islam because they live as a minority in the Muslim land. The fourth manifestation is severity and harshness where there is no tolerance for any relieve on situations of necessity. Firmness must be adhered to at all cost according to these extremists even when firmness is only mentioned in connection with two situations in Quran; first in connection with the war against oppression and self-defense (Chapter 9 verse 123) second in connection with carrying out the Islamically prescribed penalties for specified transgressions against humanity (Quran chapter 24 verse 2). In the area of calling one to Islam, there is no place for violence or harshness (Qaradawi, 1991:28).

The fifth manifestation is thinking ill of others that do not share the same view with these misguided youths. The six manifestation is when the perception of the extremists reached the stage of 'Takfir' where anyone that do not conform to their

thoughts, perceptions and actions is considered as a ‘Kafir’ (infidel or a disbeliever even if he is a devoted Muslim) (Qaradawi, 1991:31). In this stage, a dangerous level is reached of taking arms against the public and constituted authorities provided they didn’t agree with the views of the groups and this has been the clear explanation of the emergence of insurgents and terror groups in the name of Islam recently across the globe including the Boko Haram and other related sects in the Muslim world. Al Qaradawi (1991) concluded that these groups has nothing to do with Islam since Islam in all its ramifications is about justice, peace and betterment of mankind. The Prophet (PBUH) warned his future generation of the emergence of these extremists who will take arms against the Muslim and he even directed that they should be fought. This study shares the same position with Al Qaradawi. These manifestations are presented in a model below for a better understanding.

Figure 2: Al Qaradawi’s (1991) Six Stages of Extremism and Emergence of Insurgent Groups in Islam



Source: Design by the Authors 2018.

Method of Data Collection and Analysis

The study is a qualitative approach or research design which gives emphasis on a paradigm of data collection from all sources that are seemingly few in nature but, very rich in contents and value (Creswell, 2014:7). It is precisely a phenomenological form of qualitative data method (Bogden & Biklen,

2007:16) where the phenomenon of Boko Haram is examined in terms of its nature, causes, why the Phenomenon in Northern Nigeria and why from Muslims and Islam and what makes it violent attacking both the non-Muslims and the Muslims that it claimed to establish an Islamic state for?

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source is a personal interview with some selected informants from the stakeholders that are involved in the security matters. The informants selected are six from the various security agencies of military and paramilitary that are involved actively in operation in the Boko Haram dominated areas. Five academicians were selected from four northern universities in University of Maiduguri (Unimaid), Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (ABU), Bayero University Kano (BUK), Gombe State University (GSU) and Federal University Kashere Gombe (FUK). Six repented insurgents were accessed for the interview in their rehabilitation camp in Malam Sidi in Gombe State. Six members of international donors were interviewed from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations (UN), Save the Children, Amnesty International, United State Agency for International Development (USAID) and European Union (EU). Six members of the civil societies that are operating in the Northeastern Nigeria were selected and interviewed. 12 IDPs were interviewed with three selected each from Borno, Adamawa and Gombe in the state capitals IDPs' camps. The selection criteria were based on accessibility and feasibility of resources at hand and the consideration of the suggested number for qualitative interview by Sharan (2002) as 30 and Lune & Berg (2013) a maximum of 40. Other primary sources include documented reports from government and international agencies.

The secondary source is the use of books, journals and internet sources. The data obtained from the primary source was coded into categories alphabetically as A, B and C accordingly. For instance, category A is the security agencies, category B is the academicians, category C is the repented insurgents, category D is the international donor agencies, category E is members of civil societies and category F is the IDPs. The data obtained were presented using thematic analytical interpretations and content analysis where themes were identified from the data and discussed with the existing knowledge in the field of study as well as the application of the theoretical underpinnings used in the work.

Table 3: List of Informants and their Category

| Category | Informants | Frequen | Total |
|----------|------------|---------|-------|
|----------|------------|---------|-------|

| | | cy | |
|---|------------------------------------|----|----|
| A | Military and paramilitary agencies | 6 | 6 |
| B | Academicians | 5 | 11 |
| C | Repented insurgents | 6 | 17 |
| D | International donor groups | 6 | 23 |
| E | Civil societies | 6 | 29 |
| F | IDPs | 12 | 41 |

Source: Field Survey by the Authors 2018

Discussion and Analysis: Examination of the Sources of Weapons, Funds and Logistics for Boko Haram Insurgents

In this section, the data obtained from the field were discussed according to some formed themes in consideration with the responses from the informants and the existing literature and theoretical framework as presented below.

Source of Weapons for Boko Haram

Boko Haram sourced its own weapons from different means as revealed by many informants interviewed in this work. For instance, one of the informants in category B (the academicians) narrated that: "The Boko Haram secured their weapons through attacks and raiding of military barracks in Northern Nigeria and other security outfits where arsenals are stored". In another view, another informant in category A (security agencies) mentioned that: "Sometimes the disgruntled security personnel used to sell their weapons to the insurgents to survive because of poor motivation by the government". In another view, another informant in category C (the repented insurgents) revealed that: "the Boko Haram groups developed the skills of producing IEDs, explosives, landmines deposit and other sophisticated means that they used to attack the security personnel". In a different view from an informant, it has been established that the Boko Haram sourced for their weapons through training on how to produce explosives and guns in addition to operation of the confiscated weapons from the Nigerian security. This has been revealed by an informant in category D (international donor agencies).

A report from the Intelligence Briefing (2015) indicated that Boko Haram possessed varieties of weapons such as assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and improvised bombs and shells. The sect also acquired a considerable number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and anti-aircraft capability. The Report further added that the weapons are stolen, improvised or purchased. The Report alleged that the weapons are mostly stocks from Russian and Eastern European products confiscated from police stations and army barracks. Other sources according to the Report are weapons purchased from black market in Europe, Libya and West Africa. (Retrieved from <https://www.openbriefing.org/publications/intelligence-briefings/reducing-the-supply-of-weapons-to-boko-haram/>).

Another work suggested that handmade weapons and craft in Nigeria have been boosted and developed rapidly from the 2000 to date. The report indicated that many civilians learned how to make rifles, local explosives and other ammunition such as bullets. This has been because of the ethno-religious conflicts and the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria (Nowak & Gsell, 2018).

From the theoretical perspective, the two theories of Social Conflict theory and the Doctrine of Extremism are applicable here because in the first instance, citizens acquire weapons or groups and turned violent when there is an extreme level of inequality and injustice in the society as in Nigerian case. The theory is further justified in its assumptions that conflict escalate in some societies because the root causes and its dimension are not taken into consideration. For instance, the Nigerian violence or insurgency could be prevented before its occurrence through good governance that will reduce poverty, unemployment, inequality and other social problems.

In the second aspect, the Doctrine of Extremism is applicable here in the explanation of the sources of weapons for Boko Haram because the group manifested all forms of extremism from one stage to another until it reached the last stage of Takfir where it felt the last option is to procure weapons and fight all those who differ with them in their understanding. Thus, the preparation began as earlier thought or expected because the group anticipated violent clashes with the Nigerian security soon during their early stages of extremism.

Sources of Finance for Boko Haram

There are divergent views from the informants on the sources of finance of Boko Haram. One of the informants in an interview (category C, repented insurgents) narrated that: "Sometimes we were asked to pay some token as membership dues by our leader and in some other times, we kidnapped people or send to them messages demanding for ransom or they should get themselves killed if they failed to pay". In another view, an informant in category B (Academicians) revealed that: "The Boko Haram organised itself and sourced for money internally and externally. Internally, they pay dues, work in different petty businesses and artisanship. Sometimes they receive huge sum of money from the government to release important captives like foreign experts and they extort money from the people as well. Externally, they received money in foreign cash from sister organisations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS and from hidden or invisible hands not yet identified". In another version of the interview, an informant in category E (civil societies), mentioned that: "The Boko Haram sourced for their funds from various sources including collection of donation from wealthy members, kidnapping, exchange of prisoners for cash, external sources and petty business engagements in different towns of the Northern part of the country.


The sources of funding of Boko Haram is not identified reliably. They have different alternatives towards securing funding for running of their activities. It is believed that Boko Haram sourced for their money from within Nigeria and West Africa. Boko Haram is believed to be a well-funded organisation for criminal activities internally and externally. The US Government believed that Boko Haram sourced for their funding from criminal activities especially kidnappings for ransom. Another source from the US identified that the Boko Haram insurgents used the Nigerian porous border in West Africa to transport huge cash into Nigeria (Rock, 2016:2).

Rock (2016) further argued that Boko Haram sourced for funding through eight major means. The first one is Microfinancing. This is done through offering of cash loan to registered members to run local businesses in various parts of Nigeria. The International Aid Organisation Mercy Corps discovered that the Boko Haram offered loan worth N10, 000 (\$27.8) up to N1 million (\$2778) in recent years. Another source is membership fees. Prior to 2009, the Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf enforced membership fees ranging from N100 (\$0.30) and beyond. A group, Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reported that, even after Yusuf's death in 2009, membership fees were collected towards 2012. The Boko Haram sourced for their funding also from external funding from the sister organisations such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and other insurgents' groups. The fourth source is robbing of banks. Boko Haram was reported to have robbed hundreds of banks for over

three-year period for an estimated 2.4 billion naira (\$6 million). The fifth source is extortion of the citizens through threats of calls, text messages and physical visit to demand ransom from identified targets. Other sources are kidnapping, illicit trafficking and speculations. The above view is also shared by Intelligence Brief (2015), Eme (2016), Moses (2017) and Nowak & Gsell (2018).

The two theories used in the work are practically applicable here. In the first place, the Social Conflict theory explained that conflict in the society are caused by different means and are divergent in nature as some of the conflicts can be violent such as insurgency with reference to Boko Haram. In the second theory of the Doctrine of Extremism, it can be seen that the nature and level of the extremism of the Boko Haram sect led them into a violence through mobilisation of funds to secure weapons and logistics to achieve their aim. A model is adopted from Kumar (2014) to indicate by illustration the sources of funding of Boko Haram as indicated below.

Figure 3: Model Showing the Sources of Funding for Boko Haram



Boko Haram sourced for their logistics such as foods, water supply, healthcare facilities and movement from one place of attacks to another in addition to intelligence through various sources just like their finances. One of the informant in category C (repented insurgents) narrated that: "We have various means of securing our logistics. We raid villages for food and water, we stormed hospitals and abduct nurses and doctors and we rely on locals for intelligence and movement by playing with their psychology that it is a Jihad that they are helping us to do". Another informant in category B (Academicians) opined that: "Boko Haram sourced for their logistics through kidnapping, bribing of local people, stealing, raiding of villages and towns and disguise through sending some of its members to melt with the public and secure their needs for them". In a different version, an informant in category D (international donor agencies) revealed that: "The Boko Haram secured their logistics through bribing the Nigerian security personnel and bureaucrats, brainwashing the host communities and use of threats, extortion, kidnapping, intelligence gathering, disguise and other means".

The above views of the informants were also supported by many scholars in their works including Intelligence Brief (2015), Eme (2016), Moses (2017) and Nowak & Gsell (2018). Additionally, the theories used in the work can be applied here practically. The Social Conflict theory expresses the fact that conflicts can emerged from religious misperception and social crises and this is exactly the case here because religious misperception and social injustice and inequality compelled some intolerant youths to identify feasible logistics to counter the existing political and social order. In the second theory, the Doctrine of Extremism, the theory stresses that extremism can led some youths in Islam to reach a dangerous level of actions that will drag them into insurgency and terrorism. The Boko Haram fall within this category.

Conclusion and Recommendation

It is concluded in this study that the Boko Haram is a deleterious phenomenon which devastated the Northern parts of the country for more than ten years claiming thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Naira. The Boko Haram insurgency started as a peaceful but, radical preaching against the Western educational, political and social order but later metamorphosed into a full-blown insurgency in 1999 when their leader, late Muhammad Yusuf was killed in an extrajudicial passion. It is concluded that the Boko Haram has diverse means of sourcing for their weapons, finances and logistics ranging from internal and external sources.

This study concluded that, the Boko Haram sect is not a peaceful movement or a group that has the peaceful intention otherwise, why the gathering of sophisticated prior to the famous 2009 clash with the security personnel in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital which was believed to have set the sect ablaze with insurgency and violence. The group, concluded this work, has a violent motive from its inception. This is supported by the postulations presented by Al Qaradawi (1991) of the manifestations of violent and terror groups in six stages among the Muslim Ummah. It is concluded that the misperception, misinterpretation and misguidance of some ignorant youths dragged them into insurgency through sourcing of weapons and logistics to fight the government and the public at large. It is concluded that the group or the sect can be contained appropriately if their sources of weapons, finances and logistics are identified and blocked to make them surrender in fiasco. The study recommends the following as long-term panaceas to curtail the incidence of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and to cater for other militant groups in the country in future.

1. The sources of weapons, finances and logistics of the Boko Haram should be identified and blocked totally to deprive them of the power of attacks and defense for easy defeat;
2. The Boko Haram sect should be engaged in dialogue where necessary to handle them peacefully without a conventional operation to minimise cost of security maintenance in the country;
3. Religious associations should be censored and monitored closely to identify any radical or extremist groups and deter them in its early stage;
4. The local community should be sensitise to avoid supplying information and intelligence to the Boko Haram insurgents and
5. The government in the country should provide a decent, sustainable and reasonable means of survival for all its citizens in terms of good governance, transparency, gainful employment, poverty reduction and bridging the gap of inequality.

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